The greatest Stedilnica crisis in History

1500 Health Insurance Claim Form - The greatest Stedilnica crisis in History

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A accident the size of the Tat crisis, is, inevitably, political. It involves thousands of citizens, many decision makers from every walk of life and the very economic and financial fabric of the country.

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1500 Health Insurance Claim Form

But, the Tat accident pales in comparison with other, similar, crises in other countries in the world.

In Israel in 1983, All the banks collapsed on One October day, for instance!

The biggest accident of savings and loans institutions (=Stedilnicas) in history happened in the Usa in the years 1986-1987.

A Savings and Loans relationship (Sla), or a Thrift, was a strange banking hybrid, very much akin to the construction Societies in Britain. On the one hand, it was a sort of a bank, allowed to take in deposits. On the other hand, it was allowed to land money only to current or prospective homeowners on the basis of a mortgage on their house. It was no ifs ands or buts a mortgage bank and only that. This limitation on the nature of their asset portfolio, increased the risk related with their lending. The Slas could not diversify their portfolio into other kinds of assets and so were exposed to the vicissitudes of the residential real estate markets in their respective regions. Sure enough, when the real estate markets experienced a general business cycle slump, the Slas were disproportionately affected. Regional economic shocks (such as down spiralling commodity prices) rocked the value of real estate and the stability of these lending institutions. The coup de grace was delivered through the inordinately vaporing interest rates. Slas had to pay short term depositors high interest - while collecting lower income, in the form of interest payments on their old loans. This negative spread between the cost of funds and the assets' yield - eroded the operating margins of the Slas. When they discovered that the securities that they were keeping were much less valuable than the loans that they were intended to derive - panic ensued.

Hundreds of thousands of depositors crowded to draw their funds. Hundreds of Slas (out of a total of more than 3,000) were rendered insolvent, unable to pay their depositors. They had to shut up their gates and were put to siege by angry - at times, violent - clients who lost their life savings.

The illiquidity spread like fire. One stedilnica after the other collapsed, leaving in their wake major financial crises, ruined businesses and homeowners, devastated communities. The accident reached immense proportions and threatened the stability of the whole banking principles all over the Usa.

The Federal Savings and Loans assurance Corporation (Fslic) - which insured the deposits in Slas - could no longer pay the claims and, in effect, went bankrupt. This particular event had a chilling result on the Federal government. True, the government did not warrant the obligations of the Fslic. Still, it was perceived to be an arm of the Federal Government and the social shock and outrage were beyond description.

So, the Federal Government was forced to step in. A hasty 0 billion (!) package was put in place to save what could still be saved. This was the first step, a right and allowable reflex: the injection of liquidity through a special agency, the Fhfb. Every person complex postponed the mutual accusations, the criminal charges, the resignations and recriminations to a later stage. First and foremost the principles had to be stabilized and it could be stabilized only through the restoration of social trust. social trust could be restored only with money - and with a lot of it. The visible, unambiguous involvement of the top level authorities had a positive, long term effect. The "full faith and prestige of the Usa" was now behind the Slas and that was good adequate for everyone.

Now, that the storm was over, it was time for more farfetched, structural changes.

First, the administration of banks and banking operations was taken from the Central Bank, the Federal Reserve. This separation of functions was long overdue: the Central Bank can hardly be incredible to supervise a game the rules of which it dictates. There was bound to be a bias in its determination of its "clients" (not to mention the close personal relationships fostered in years of common work).

Thus, the following complex buildings emerged:

The Federal Deposit assurance Corporation (Fdic) operates the Bank assurance Fund (Bif) and the Savings Associations assurance Fund (Saif), detach assurance funds for banks and Slas.

Banks pay premiums at one rate to Bif - Slas pay at another to Saif.

Fdic is designed to be independent in two ways. Its money comes from premiums and earnings of the two assurance funds, not from Congressional appropriations. Its board of directors has full authority to run the agency. The board has laws to follow, but no boss.

The Fdic regulates banks and Slas with the aim to avoid assurance claims by depositors. When an practice becomes unsound, the Fdic can lend it money or take it over. If it takes over, it can run it and then sell it as a going concern. It has the authority to close it, pay off the depositors and try to derive the loans. Often the borrowers cannot pay, so the Fdic ends up owning collateral for loans, say real estate and trying to sell it.

The Resolution Trust Corporation (Rtc) is a direct result of the Slas scandal. Prior to 1989, Slas were insured by the now-defunct Fslic. The Fdic insured only banks. Congress had to eliminate Fslic and put the assurance of Slas under Fdic. Still, a great whole of Slas were regarded as "special risk" cases. They were given over to the jurisdiction of the Rtc. It took over Slas that failed under Fslic and later - until August 1992. It operated and sold Slas - or paid depositors and fulfilled, the relevant Slas (just like the Fdic does). The money to finance the Rtc came from bonds sold by a new government corporation (Resolution Fund Corporation, RefCorp). Rtc ceased to effectively operate last year.

The Office of Thrift administration (Ots) was also established in 1989 and it also supervises Slas.

This used to be the function of the Federal Home Loan Board (Fhlb), which was dismantled by Congress in 1989. Ots is a group within the Treasury Department, but law and practice make it approximately an independent agency. It supervises around 1500 thrifts with assets of circa 1 trillion Dollars.

The Federal Housing Finance Board (Fhfb) regulates and examines Slas - but with emphasis on their liquidity. It aids their financial stability through lines of prestige from twelve regional Federal Home Loan Banks (Fhlb). Those banks and the thrifts make up the Federal Home Loan Bank principles (Fhlbs). Many Fhfb regulations are intended to make sure that Slas lend for housing - the imagine that Congress created this bank-like system, separated from the banks.

Fhfb gets its funds from the principles and is independent of administrative field supervision.

A host of other supervisory and regulatory agencies and treasury departments is complex in the American banking system. But at least one thing was achieved: a clear, streamlined, noteworthy regulatory hierarchy. Slas (and banks, for this matter) utilized the blurring generated by the overlapping areas of performance and authority of the numerous former agencies. No one group had the full picture. Now, all became obvious: assurance was the Fdic's job, administration was the Ots's and liquidity was the realm of the Fhlb. This may, arguably, be the biggest advantage which stemmed from this, otherwise, nerve - wrecking crisis.

The process was not devoid of mistakes. Wholesome thrifts were coaxed and cajoled to purchase less sturdy ones. This weakened their equilibrium sheets considerably and the government reneged on its promises to allow them to amortize the goodwill element of the purchase over 40 years. Despite all this, the figures are unequivocal:

Thrifts numbered 2,898 in 1989. Six years later, their whole shrank to 1,612 and it is forecast to go down to less than 1,000 at the turn of the millennium. A process of consolidation is evident: Slas merge, become bigger, stronger, great capitalized. They look as if banks, in this sense.

This last improvement was so overwhelming, that Congress decided to inquire that each Slas should have a bank lease by the year 1998. Paradoxically, the very success of the Slas in curative themselves led to their elimination. Why have two kinds of banks if all the operational parameters are equal? Why use two names, two detach assurance and administration bureaucracies and two sets of regulations to monitor and regulate essentially the same kind of entities? This was absurd. While in the height of the accident the ratio of the Slas equity to their assets was less than 1% - it reached approximately 10% (!) in 1994 - great even than banks.

This noteworthy turnarounds (one of the most striking in human financial history) was brought about by serendipity as much as by truthful planning. Interest rate spreads became very inevitable (Slas were able to derive interest - for, instance, by investing in government securities - which was much higher than the interest that they paid for their sources). The stock exchanges soared and enabled the Slas to offer new stock at exquisite prices. This, together with the persistent pruning of the weeds in the field of good Slas, with downsizing of the bloated bureaucracies of the Slas and with the on going consolidation process - led to the revitalization of these banking institutions.

The overall banking markets shrank as other types of financial intermediaries joined the fray - but the health of the Slas was guaranteed.

As this new found health became more and more evident, the legislative bodies eased up. Congress began to implement the gradual repeal of the draconian Glas-Steagall law (which forbade banks from dealing with a whole range of financial activities). They realized that the more diversified the financial practice is - the healthier it is likely to be. Limiting a bank to inevitable types of assets or to a inevitable geographical location was dangerous. Congress began, therefore, to lift these restrictions.

One element need not be neglected in this discourse: the relative absence of political intervention in the handling of the crisis. It was managed by the Federal hold - an able, utterly professional, blatantly a-political body. This is the most autonomous central bank in the world. It is never afraid to face the two biggest powers in the world: the President of the Usa and social view - and it does this often. It thrives not on friction but on the proper, impartial administration of the economy.

This, by all means, is the biggest episode to be learnt.

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